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The Individual and Society in Durkheim: Unpicking the Contradictions 
Finn Bowring 
 
 
Abstract 
IŶ the ƌeǀisitiŶg of Duƌkheiŵ͛s huŵaŶisŵ iŶ ƌeĐent years, attention has been drawn to his 
theory of moral individualism and the usefulness of his argument that a reformed 
democratic capitalism can reconcile individual freedom with collective constraint. Here I 
investigate Duƌkheiŵ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ iŶdiǀidual aŶd soĐietǇ in 
greater detail, showing in the process that his thinking was ambiguous and inconsistent. 
Although he flirted with the notion that capitalist modernity may actively foster and 
legitimise destructive forms of individualism, his default position was to attribute anti-social 
drives to a human nature set loose by weak or inadequate social norms, and then to idealise 
liberal humanism as the ethical remedy for this normative deficiency. I argue that the 
inconsistencies in his thinking are significant, however, because they testify to the 
underlying contradiction between the logic of capitalism and the ideals of moral 
individualism, and to the difficulty of locating the moral individual in a morally irrational 
world. 
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Durkheim’s humanism 
In the revival of Durkheim scholarship in recent years, two prominent themes stand out. 
One is the reconstruction of Durkheim as an action theorist, for whom social reality is an 
emergent property of collective practices (Rawls 1996, 2001, 2003, 2012). The other is the 
ƌeĐlaiŵiŶg of Duƌkheiŵ͛s theoƌǇ of ͚ŵoƌal iŶdiǀidualisŵ͛ as aŶ aŶtidote to FouĐauldian 
cynicism and a restatement of the unfinished project of liberal-communitarian humanism 
(Joas 2008, 2013; Cladis 1992a, 1992b; Callegaro 2012; Lukes and Prabhat 2012; Hodgkiss 
2013). While the former arouses some interesting epistemological questions, the latter 
carries a more obvious ethical attraction, claiming as it does to have found a reassuring 
harmony between the belief in human dignity and the highly differentiated yet 
interdependent character of global modernity. 
 Although both intepretations of Durkheim can be accused of glossing over 
contradictions in his thinking, it is the iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐies iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s understanding of the 
individual which interest me here. In what follows I will detail the teŶsioŶs iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s 
theory of the individual in order to challenge the idea that there is a straightforward moral 
or cultural remedy for the pathological forms of individualism that afflict Western societies. 
There are, as we shall see, fundamental disĐƌepaŶĐies iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s theory of the 
relationship between individual and society, but in my view these discrepancies are 
testimony to the way the structural contradictions of capitalist societies produce forms of 
identity and legitimising concepts of the self that both conflict with, and impair, the ideal of 
moral individualism. 
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Social facts and the collective good 
In The Rules of Sociological Method [1895] Durkheim made the novel claim that social 
phenomena should ďe studied sĐieŶtifiĐallǇ, ͚as eǆteƌŶal thiŶgs͛, existing as stable realities 
͚detaĐhed fƌoŵ the ĐoŶsĐious ďeiŶgs ǁho foƌŵ theiƌ oǁŶ ŵeŶtal ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of theŵ͛. 
SoĐial faĐts haǀe a ͚pƌopeƌtǇ of ƌesistaŶĐe͛, he famously wrote, exerting a ͚ĐoeƌĐiǀe͛ aŶd 
͚ĐoŶstƌaiŶiŶg͛ poǁeƌ supeƌioƌ to the iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐoŶsĐiousŶess aŶd ǁill, and constituting a 
foƌĐe of ͚ŶeĐessitǇ͛ that ͚is ofteŶ iŶeluĐtaďle͛. (Durkheim 1982: 52, 70) In the standard 
positivist reading of this work, Durkheim was advancing a dualistic analysis, in which the 
strength of the individual and that of society are inversely related. The function of social 
facts is thus to hold the anti-social tendencies of the individual in check so as to maintain 
social order. This has ďeeŶ Đalled Duƌkheiŵ͛s ͚ĐoŶtaiŶeƌ͛ ŵodel of soĐietǇ. ͚SuĐh is aŶǇ 
container distinguished from the things it ĐoŶtaiŶs.͛ ;StoŶe aŶd FaƌďeƌŵaŶ ϭϵϲϳ: ϭϱϬͿ  
As a kind of inverted complement to this dualism, Durkheim also distinguished those 
social facts made visible by the hard-won Cartesian rigour of the social scientist, from the 
͚sĐheŵatiĐ, suŵŵaƌǇ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitute the pƌeŶotioŶs that ǁe eŵploǇ iŶ 
our norŵal ǁaǇ of life͛. The latteƌ aƌe the spoŶtaŶeous ďut uŶsatisfaĐtoƌǇ pƌoduĐt of an 
͚ideologiĐal aŶalǇsis͛ whose dependence on the illusions of common sense is ͚the Ŷatuƌal 
iŶĐliŶatioŶ of ouƌ ŵiŶd͛. In order to study the social forces that denature the individual, in 
otheƌ ǁoƌds, soĐiologists ŵust ƌeǀeƌse a pƌoĐess that is itself a ͚Ŷatuƌal iŶĐliŶatioŶ͛ – they 
must throw off the yoke of beliefs ͚iŶǀested ǁith a kiŶd of asĐeŶdaŶĐǇ aŶd authoƌitǇ͛ aŶd 
ǁhose ͚ƌesistaŶĐe [ǁe feel] ǁheŶ ǁe seek to fƌee ouƌselǀes fƌoŵ theŵ͛ ;ϭϵϴϮ: ϲϬ-3). 
This familiar suŵŵaƌǇ of Duƌkheiŵ͛s eaƌlǇ positiǀisŵ does need qualifying, however. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Durkheim made a point of distancing himself from the pessimistic 
positions of Hobbes and Rousseau. For them, he says, there is an erroneous ͚break in 
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ĐoŶtiŶuitǇ ďetǁeeŶ the iŶdiǀidual aŶd soĐietǇ͛, ǁith the aŶti-social nature of the individual 
making some form of external control an artificial but necessary requirement of social order 
(1982: ϭϰϮͿ. AgaiŶst this ǀieǁ that the iŶdiǀidual is ͚oďduƌate to the ĐoŵŵoŶ life aŶd ĐaŶ 
oŶlǇ ƌesigŶ hiŵself to it if foƌĐed to do so͛ ;1982: 142), Durkheim was already stressing the 
moral and intellectual superiority of society, and its articulation with internalised motives, 
desires and aspirations – suĐh that eǆteƌŶal ͚ĐoŶstƌaiŶt iŶ tiŵe Đeases to ďe felt…ďeĐause it 
gradually gives rise to...inner tendencies which rendeƌ it supeƌfluous͛ ;ϭϵϴϮ: ϱϰͿ. The 
iŶdiǀidual͛s ͚suďoƌdiŶatioŶ͛ to soĐietǇ is aĐĐepted, moreover, not out of a fear of a Leviathan 
or through the calculated pursuit of self-iŶteƌest, ďut ďeĐause it ƌests oŶ ͚feeliŶgs of 
attachment and respect which habit has iŵplaŶted ǁithiŶ hiŵ͛ ;1982: 144). In the 1901 
preface to the second edition of The Rules, Durkheim reiterated this point, emphasising how 
social obligations are sustained by a positive ͚attaĐhŵeŶt͛ that presupposes ͚soŵethiŶg 
more internal and intimate thaŶ dutǇ͛, ŶaŵelǇ, a seŶse of the ͚good͛ ;1982: 47 n4). Hence 
his lateƌ ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ that it is Ŷot ͚phǇsiĐal ĐoŶstƌaiŶt͛, ďut ƌatheƌ ͚ŵoƌal authoƌitǇ͛, ǁhiĐh is 
the ͚esseŶĐe of soĐial life͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϱϲ ŶϰͿ.  
What would society be like without an internalised understanding of the common 
good? In The Division of Labour in Society [1893] Durkheim called the form of social 
organisation imagined to be adequate by the utilitarians – a society based on competitive 
self-interest – ͚Ŷegatiǀe solidaƌitǇ͛. Negative solidarity is a social order based on contractual 
non-interference rather than wilful commitment to a common goal, ĐoŶsistiŶg ͚Ŷot iŶ 
seƌǀiŶg, ďut iŶ Ŷot haƌŵiŶg͛. ͚It does Ŷot lead ǁills to ŵoǀe toǁaƌd ĐoŵŵoŶ eŶds, ďut 
merely makes things gravitate around wills in orderly fashioŶ.͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϭϲͿ When negative 
solidarity breaks down, as when there are civil or economic disputes, the reparations that 
resolve the conflict do not require the agreement of the opposing parties, but simply the 
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restoration of the status Ƌuo aŶte. ͚Faƌ fƌoŵ uŶitiŶg, theiƌ task is ƌatheƌ to sepaƌate ǁhat 
has been united through the force of things, to re-establish the limits which have been 
tƌaŶsgƌessed aŶd ƌeplaĐe eaĐh iŶ its pƌopeƌ spheƌe…But the tƌouďled oƌdeƌ is the saŵe; it 
ƌesults, Ŷot iŶ ĐoŶĐuƌƌeŶĐe, ďut iŶ puƌe aďsteŶtioŶ.͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϭϵͿ Negatiǀe solidaƌitǇ is a 
͚tƌouďled oƌdeƌ͛ ďeĐause it ͚is Ŷot a tƌue solidaƌitǇ͛; it ͚does not produce any integration by 
itself͛, but rather pƌesupposes it. ͚Negatiǀe solidaƌitǇ is possiďle only where there exists 
soŵe otheƌ of a positiǀe Ŷatuƌe, of ǁhiĐh it is at oŶĐe the ƌesultaŶt aŶd the ĐoŶditioŶ.͛ 
(1964: 119-120, 129) 
 
Positive solidarity 
Duƌkheiŵ͛s allusioŶ to a ͚positive͛ solidaƌitǇ returns us to the role of shared conceptions of 
the good. In pre-industrial societies positive solidarity originated from the strength of the 
͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛ – common sentiments and values which dominated the individual to 
the extent that novel or divergent acts were a rarity. The collective conscience is certainly 
internalised, but the effect of this internalisation is to suppress the individual more 
thoƌoughlǇ thaŶ aŶǇ puƌelǇ ͚eǆteƌŶal͛ foƌĐe Đould do. ͚IŶ soĐieties ǁheƌe this tǇpe of 
solidarity is prominent, the iŶdiǀidual does Ŷot appeaƌ͛; ͚ouƌ iŶdiǀidualitǇ is Ŷil͛ (1964: 130). 
͚This solidaƌitǇ͛, Duƌkheiŵ asseƌts, ͚ĐaŶ gƌoǁ oŶlǇ iŶ iŶǀeƌse ƌatio to peƌsoŶalitǇ͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϮϵͿ. 
 As societies develop, however, and processes of differentiation break down the 
bonds of likeness, the collective ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe ďeĐoŵes ͚feeďler aŶd ǀagueƌ͛, ͚ŵoƌe aďstƌaĐt 
aŶd ŵoƌe iŶdeĐisiǀe͛ (1964: 171), and its socially integrating power declines. What seems to 
take its place is the diversification of roles and functions whose interconnectedness 
engenders a positive sense of cohesion. It is, then, ͚the diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ ǁhiĐh, ŵoƌe aŶd 
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more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the principal 
ďoŶd of soĐial aggƌegates of higheƌ tǇpes͛ ;1964: 173). 
IŶ deǀotiŶg seǀeƌal Đhapteƌs to ͚pathologiĐal foƌŵs͛ of the diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ, 
Duƌkheiŵ aĐkŶoǁledged theƌe ǁeƌe ͚eǆĐeptioŶal aŶd aďŶoƌŵal ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh this 
solidarity was deficient. A division of labour that changes or accelerates too rapidly, which is 
too discontinuous to allow the stabilisation of activities and exchanges, or which separates 
the worker too dramatically from the owner, and the owner too greatly from the consumer, 
leads to uŶƌealistiĐ ;͚aŶoŵiĐ͛Ϳ eǆpeĐtatioŶs, soĐial conflict and economic crises. A division of 
laďouƌ ǁhiĐh is ͚foƌĐed͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚spoŶtaŶeous͛, ǁhiĐh ƌepƌoduĐes hieƌaƌĐhies of soĐial 
pƌiǀilege aŶd iŶheƌited ǁealth iŶstead of ďeiŶg ĐoŶstituted, ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐallǇ, ͚iŶ suĐh a ǁaǇ 
that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities͛, also Đauses conflict and disunity 
by violating the modern moral principle of fair exchange. These deviant forms are then 
ĐoŶtƌasted ǁith the solidaƌitǇ that aƌises fƌoŵ the diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ iŶ its ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ state:  
 
For, normally, the role of each special function does not require that the individual 
close himself in, but that he keep himself in constant relations with neighbouring 
functions, take conscience of their needs, of the changes which they undergo, etc. 
The division of labour presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his 
task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to 
them. He is, then, not a machine who repeats his movements without knowing their 
meaning, but he knows that they tend, in some way, towards an end that he 
conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that he is serving something. (1964: 372) 
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Theƌe is aŶ oďǀious aŵďiguitǇ iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s aĐĐouŶt heƌe, foƌ although he ǁaŶts to 
distiŶguish oƌgaŶiĐ solidaƌitǇ fƌoŵ the ͚Ŷegatiǀe͛ solidarity of utilitarian theory, he also 
ǁaŶts to distiŶguish it fƌoŵ the ͚ŵeĐhaŶiĐal͛ solidaƌitǇ that ƌests oŶ a stƌoŶg ĐolleĐtiǀe 
ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe. Theƌe aƌe, he saǇs, ͚tǁo kiŶd of positiǀe solidaƌitǇ͛:  
 
In the first, what we call society is a more or less organised totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to all the members of the group: this is the collective type. On 
the other hand, the society in which we are solidary in the second instance is a 
system of different, special functions which definite relations unite. (1964: 129) 
 
Organic solidarity, Durkheim seems to argue, rests neither on reciprocal self-interest, 
as the utilitarians claim, nor on normative consensus, as does mechanical solidarity. Instead, 
thanks to the division of labour, ǁoƌkeƌs ͚collaborate͛ to meet a practical goal, with the 
repetition of actions breeding a consciousness of their mutual interdependency and an 
awareness of the collective end theǇ ͚seƌǀe͛. Yet this ǀisioŶ of aŶ iŶdiǀidual ǁhose ͚pƌopeƌ 
dutǇ͛ is ͚to ďe aŶ oƌgaŶ of soĐietǇ͛ aŶd ͚to plaǇ his ƌole as aŶ oƌgaŶ͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϰϬϯͿ is a puzzliŶg 
one, for it skirts dangerously close to that ͚ŵǇstiĐ solutioŶ͛ to the pathologies of 
individualism which Durkheim associated ǁith Hegel͛s pernicious influence and with 
socialists who wanted to ͚ƌeǀiǀe the cult of the CitǇ State͛ (1992: 54). 
The first clue that Durkheim did not take this proposition seriously in The Division of 
Labour, is that the passage Đited aďoǀe, ǁhiĐh distiŶguishes ͚tǁo kiŶds of positiǀe solidaƌitǇ͛, 
is immediately followed with a statement of clarification: ͚These tǁo soĐieties ƌeallǇ ŵake 
up oŶlǇ oŶe. TheǇ aƌe tǁo aspeĐts of oŶe aŶd the saŵe ƌealitǇ͛ ;1964: 129). Here we see the 
Durkheimian basis to the theory that modern societies are reproduced through two 
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different but parallel mechanisms of integration – the oŶe ͚functional͛, aŶd otheƌ the ͚social͛ 
(Lockwood 1964) – as well as the claim that the historical process of rationalisation is one 
that entails the pƌogƌessiǀe diffeƌeŶtiatioŶ of ͚sǇsteŵ͛ aŶd ͚lifeǁoƌld͛ ;Haďeƌŵas ϭϵϴϳͿ.  
 
Moral individualism 
The second indication that Durkheim, already in The Division of Labour, doubted that 
functional interdependencies could alone deliver a stable form of solidarity, is his scattered 
comments on the role of the collective conscience in modern society. On the one hand, 
Durkheim logically argued that the growth of the autonomous individual presupposes the 
ǁeakeŶiŶg of ĐolleĐtiǀe Ŷoƌŵs; ǁhat is a loss foƌ the ĐolleĐtiǀe is a gaiŶ foƌ the iŶdiǀidual. ͚It 
is necessary, then, that the collective conscience leave open a part of the individual 
conscience in order that special functions may be established there, functions which it 
ĐaŶŶot ƌegulate.͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϯϭͿ For the individual consciousness to have grown, the collective 
ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe ŵust haǀe deĐliŶed: ͚It ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ eŵaŶĐipated fƌoŵ the Ǉoke of the latter, 
and, consequently, the latter must have fallen from its throne and lost the determinate 
poǁeƌ that it oƌigiŶallǇ used to eǆeƌĐise.͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: 166) On the other hand, Durkheim made 
the contradictory argument that the increasing autonomy of the individual demonstrates 
how in one respect the penetration of the collective conscience has become stronger: ͚the 
only collective sentiments that have become more intense are those which have for their 
oďjeĐt, Ŷot soĐial affaiƌs, ďut the iŶdiǀidual͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϲϲͿ. 
Durkheim made some attempt to resolve this anomolie by attributing the opposing 
tendencies to chronological stages of development. The individual first emerges from the 
decline in ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe suƌǀeillaŶĐe͛ that results from the growing density and diversity of 
social interactions. Following this initial liberation, ͚the spheƌe of fƌee aĐtioŶ of eaĐh 
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individual is extended in fact, and, little by little, the faĐt ďeĐoŵes a ƌight͛. At soŵe poiŶt the 
deŵaŶds of the iŶdiǀidual peƌsoŶalitǇ ͚eŶd ďǇ ƌeĐeiǀiŶg the ĐoŶseĐƌatioŶ of Đustoŵ͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: 
299). What was originally experienced as a Ŷegatiǀe ͚fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ͛ the ĐoŶstƌaiŶts of the 
collective conscience, crystallises into a positive moral obligation and a ͚fƌeedoŵ to͛; it is 
transformed into ͚a ǀeƌǇ liǀelǇ seŶse of ƌespeĐt foƌ huŵaŶ digŶitǇ, to ǁhiĐh ǁe aƌe supposed 
to ĐoŶfoƌŵ as ŵuĐh iŶ ouƌ ƌelatioŶs ǁith ouƌselǀes as iŶ ouƌ ƌelatioŶs ǁith otheƌs͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: 
400). HeŶĐe ͚Ŷo oŶe todaǇ ĐoŶtests the oďligatory character of the rule which orders us to 
ďe ŵoƌe aŶd ŵoƌe of a peƌsoŶ͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϰϬϱͿ. The ethos of this ƌule comprises what, in 
͚IŶdiǀidualisŵ aŶd the IŶtelleĐtuals͛ [1898], Duƌkheiŵ Đalled the ͚ƌeligioŶ of the iŶdiǀidual͛, a 
ŵoƌal ͚sǇsteŵ of ďeliefs͛ ǁhich does not lead, as utilitarian individualism does, to the 
disintegration of society, but to its harmony and preservation. Instead of ͚the utilitaƌiaŶ 
egoisŵ of SpeŶĐeƌ aŶd the eĐoŶoŵists͛, iŶstead of that ͚Đƌass ĐoŵŵeƌĐialisŵ ǁhiĐh ƌeduĐes 
society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of produĐtioŶ aŶd eǆĐhaŶge͛ ;ϭϵϳϯa: 44), 
Durkheim defended an ethical individualism formalised in human rights and founded on a 
collective belief in the sacredness of the human person. ͚Thus the iŶdiǀidualist ǁho defeŶds 
the rights of the individual defends at the same time the vital interests of society, for he 
prevents the criminal impoverishment of that last reserve of collective ideas and feelings 
which is the ǀeƌǇ soul of the ŶatioŶ.͛ ;ϭϵϳϯa: 53-4) HeŶĐe Cladis͛s ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that Durkheim 
shows how ͚theƌe is Ŷo fuŶdaŵeŶtal aŶtiŶoŵǇ ďetǁeeŶ deŵoĐƌatiĐ soĐieties aŶd the 
iŶdiǀidual͛ ;Cladis ϭϵϵϮď: ϴϯͿ. Oƌ iŶ Callegaƌo͛s ǁoƌds: ͚soĐietǇ as a ǁhole is Ŷot a 
constraining force, but the precondition for undeƌstaŶdiŶg the ǀeƌǇ huŵaŶitǇ of iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
(Callegaro 2012: 467). 
Even on this subject, however, Durkheim was ambivalent. In his account of the 
progress of organic solidarity, for example, he qualified his approval of the gƌoǁiŶg ͚ƌespeĐt 
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of society for the iŶdiǀidual͛ ďǇ ǁaƌŶiŶg that ͚this siŵple gƌoǁth of stƌeŶgth ĐaŶŶot 
ĐoŵpeŶsate foƌ the ŵultiple, seƌious losses that ǁe haǀe oďseƌǀed͛ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϭϲϳͿ. AŶd though 
The Division of Labour closes with the assertion that moral individualism binds the individual 
to the collective – ͚The duties of the iŶdiǀidual toǁaƌds hiŵself aƌe, iŶ ƌealitǇ, duties 
toǁaƌds soĐietǇ. TheǇ ĐoƌƌespoŶd to ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe seŶtiŵeŶts ǁhiĐh he ĐaŶŶot offeŶd͛ 
(1964: 399) – earlier in the same text Durkheim had made exactly the opposite assessment, 
reinvoking an atomistic individualism at war with the collective good.  
 
We erect a cult in behalf of personal dignity which, as every strong cult, already has 
its superstitions. It is thus, if one wishes, a common cult, but it is possible only by the 
ruin of all others, and, consequently, cannot produce the same effects as this 
multitude of extinguished beliefs. There is no compensation for that. Moreover, if it 
is common in so far as the community partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If it 
tuƌŶs all ǁills toǁaƌds the saŵe eŶd, this eŶd is Ŷot soĐial…It is still fƌoŵ soĐietǇ that 
it takes all its force, but it is not to society that it attaches us; it is to ourselves. 
Hence, it does not constitute a true social link. That is why we have been justly able 
to reproach the theorists who have made this sentiment exclusively basic in their 
moral doctrine, with the ensuing dissolution of society. (1964: 172, my emphasis) 
 
Negative and positive freedom 
The same tension between a negative and a positive conception of individual freedom is 
evident in the lectures developed by Durkheim at Bordeaux between 1890 and 1900, which 
were subsequently published and translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1992). 
Here Durkheim emphasised the important role the state has played in liberating the 
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individual from the grip of common norms and institutions, delivering the same negative 
freedom that the British liberal philosophers associated, in contrast, with the minimal state. 
͚It is the State that has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family 
tyranny; it is the State that has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from 
communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from guild 
tyranny.͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϲϰͿ The state is liďeƌatiŶg ͚ďeĐause, iŶ holdiŶg its ĐoŶstitueŶt soĐieties iŶ 
check, it prevents them from exerting the repressive influences over the individual that they 
ǁould otheƌǁise eǆeƌt͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϲϮ-3). The zero-sum relationship of individual and society 
seeŵs iŶesĐapaďle iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s ƌeasoŶiŶg here: ͚it is the State that redeems the individual 
from society͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϲϵ, my emphasis). Hence also Durkheim͛s aƌguŵeŶt that increasing 
respect for the individual, and the corollary desire to avoid or minimise his or her suffering, 
reflects a weakening of the collective conscience whose transgression no longer generates 
passionate outrage and violence against persons. 
 
The decline in the rate of homicide at the present day has not come about because 
respect for the human person acts as a brake on the motives for homicide or on the 
stimulants to murder, but because these motives and these stimulants grow fewer in 
number and have less intensity. These stimulants are the very collective sentiments 
that bind us to objects which are alien to humanity and the individual, that is, which 
bind us to groups or to things that are a symbol of these groups. (1992: 117) 
 
There is a second conception of individual freedom offered in Professional Ethics, 
however, which is ͚positiǀe͛. This conception stresses the role of the state in actively 
promoting the moral faculties of reason, responsibility and self-discipline whose cultivation 
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Durkheim (1961) argued, in his Sorbonne lectures of 1902-3, should be the primary concern 
of a secular education system. This conception argues that the moral content of contractual 
relations does not reside in ͚freedom from͛ constraint, but rather in the ĐoŶtƌaĐtiŶg paƌties͛ 
adherence to collective definitions of value, price and just desert (1992: 208-11). To ensure 
this positiǀe ͚fƌeedoŵ to͛, the ƌole of the state is ͚Ŷot siŵplǇ to feŶd off the opposiŶg foƌĐes 
that tend to absorb the individual: it also serves to provide the milieu in which the individual 
moves, so that he ŵaǇ deǀelop his faĐulties iŶ fƌeedoŵ͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϲϵͿ. In this sense the state 
functions as a kind of figurehead for the priŶĐiples of ŵoƌal iŶdiǀidualisŵ, its ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
dutǇ͛ ďeiŶg ͚to pƌeseƌǀe iŶ ĐalliŶg the iŶdiǀidual to a ŵoƌal ǁaǇ of life͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϲϵͿ. 
 
Homo duplex 
In Suicide [1897], of course, the distinction between a negative liberty set free from moral 
constraints, and the positive freedom of moral individualism, has graver significance, for the 
former not only jeopardises social solidarity but also ͚leads to suiĐide͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϯϯϲͿ. But what 
exactly is the difference between these two forms of individualism? Is the conflict between 
atomistic individualism and moral individualism a battle between two conflicting social 
constructions – between two ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs͛ – of the human person, or is this a 
battle between the spontaneous inclinations of human nature and the moral force of 
society? If it is true, as Parsons (1968) originally argued, that Durkheim moved from a 
positivist to an idealist position as his thinking evolved, then we would expect the former 
interpretation to be dominant in his later work, and the latter one to prevail in his early 
writings. 
 How curious, then, that in ͚The Dualisŵ of Human Nature and its Social CoŶditioŶs͛ 
[1914], written three years before his death, Durkheim reverted to what Giddens (1971) 
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calls the ͚pƌe-soĐial͛ iŶdiǀidual; that is, to the utilitarian idea of the naturally egoistic self 
which must be tamed and controlled for the sake of social order. This control, admittedly, is 
theorised as something internalised; but the social forces that are internalised still remain at 
war with the biological instincts that pre-empt them. Durkheim thus conceptualises the 
human person as internally divided – ͚homo duplex͛ – ďetǁeeŶ seŶsoƌǇ appetites that ͚aƌe 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ egoistiĐ͛ aŶd ͚haǀe ouƌ iŶdiǀidualitǇ aŶd it aloŶe as theiƌ oďjeĐt͛, aŶd the 
conceptual activity of the mind which, dealing in principle with universals, attaches us to the 
collective (1973b: ϭϱϭͿ. ͚MaŶ is douďle ďeĐause tǁo ǁoƌlds ŵeet iŶ hiŵ: that of ŶoŶ-
intelligent and amoral matter, on the one hand, and that of ideas, the spirit, and the good, 
oŶ the otheƌ.͛ ;ϭϵϳϯď: 157) Utilitarianism, Durkheim argues, has reduced human beings to 
pƌofaŶe ͚aŵoƌal ŵatteƌ͛, igŶoƌiŶg the saĐƌed ŵoƌal ideals that aŶiŵate theiƌ ŵiŶds. But iŶ 
arguing thus, he concedes considerable ground to his opponents: moral representations 
ŵust iŶduĐe foƌŵs of ĐoŶsĐiousŶess ǁhiĐh ͚Đoŵe to us fƌoŵ soĐietǇ͛, ǁhiĐh ͚tƌansfer society 
iŶto us aŶd ĐoŶŶeĐt us ǁith soŵethiŶg that suƌpasses us͛, ďeĐause iŶ theiƌ aďseŶĐe ouƌ 
behaviour would fall sway to the imperious appetites of the body, and social life would 
disintegrate. Like Freud, Durkheim understood this to mean that a price has to be paid for 
͚the gƌoǁth of ĐiǀilisatioŶ͛. ͚We ŵust, iŶ a ǁoƌd, do ǀioleŶĐe to ĐeƌtaiŶ of ouƌ stƌoŶgest 
iŶĐliŶatioŶs.͛ ͚We ĐaŶŶot puƌsue ŵoƌal eŶds ǁithout ĐausiŶg a split ǁithiŶ ouƌselǀes, 
without offending the instincts and the penchants that are the most deeply rooted in our 
ďodies.͛ (1973b: 161-3, 152; see also 2001: 235, 341-2) 
 
The origin of the antagonism that we have described is evident from the very nature 
of the elements involved in it. The conflicts of which we have given examples are 
between the sensations and the sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the 
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intellectual and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that passions and egoistic 
tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity – 
whether theoretical or practical – is dependent on social causes. (1973b: 162) 
 
 This is, in a way, a ŵoƌe sophistiĐated psǇĐhologiĐal ǀeƌsioŶ of the ͚ĐoŶtaiŶeƌ ŵodel͛ 
of society that seemed to plaǇ a ĐeŶtƌal ƌole iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s early positivism. From the 
perspective of this model, moral pathologies arise when the individual is subject either to 
excessive or insufficient social constraint, suicide being an extreme result of this 
disequilibrium. In modern societies anomie and egoism are the two dominant pathologies. 
Both, Durkheim writes in Suicide, ͚spriŶg froŵ society’s iŶsufficieŶt preseŶce iŶ individuals͛ 
(1951: 258, my emphasis). They are not normal products of a particular type of society, but 
pathological symptoms of the breakdown of society. 
In keeping with this reasoning, Durkheim describes, in Suicide, how people naturally 
desire more than they can attaiŶ. ͚Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity 
for feeling is in itself aŶ iŶsatiaďle aŶd ďottoŵless aďǇss͛, aŶd ͚if ŶothiŶg eǆteƌŶal ĐaŶ 
ƌestƌaiŶ this ĐapaĐitǇ, it ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe a souƌĐe of toƌŵeŶt to itself͛ (1951: 247, my emphasis). 
It is because society is a moral power superior to the individual that the limits it imposes – 
the definition of just and appropriate goals, actions and rewards – are respected and 
adhered to, with the resulting realism making possible a healthy contentment with life. 
Insufficient moral regulation of desires, on the other hand – which may occur when social 
norms and expectations are in a state of flux, or when moral rules cannot be recalibrated 
fast enough to keep pace with sudden impƌoǀeŵeŶts oƌ deteƌioƌatioŶs iŶ people͛s ŵateƌial 
conditions of existence – giǀes ƌise to that ŵoƌďidlǇ ͚feǀeƌish iŵpatieŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚ŵaladǇ of 
iŶfiŶite aspiƌatioŶ͛ that ĐhaƌaĐteƌises ͚aŶoŵie͛.1 
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Anomie 
Evidence that this theory of anomie was unsatisfactory to Durkheim, however, comes from 
the way Durkheim himself vacillated in his formulation of it. Comparing anomie with 
͚egoisŵ͛ – which I will return to in a moment – Durkheim suggested a neat distinction: 
egoism is cerebral and introspectiǀe, aŶoŵie is passioŶatelǇ eŵotioŶal. ͚The foƌŵeƌ is lost iŶ 
the iŶfiŶitǇ of dƌeaŵs, the seĐoŶd iŶ the iŶfiŶitǇ of desiƌes.͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϴϳͿ This distiŶĐtioŶ is 
already undermined, however, when Durkheim explains that what makes humans 
susceptible to anomie is the higher moral faculty of consciousness – ͚a ŵoƌe aǁakeŶed 
ƌefleĐtioŶ [ǁhiĐh] suggests ďetteƌ ĐoŶditioŶs, seeŵiŶglǇ desiƌaďle eŶds ĐƌaǀiŶg fulfilŵeŶt͛ 
(1951: 247). This contrasts with the non-huŵaŶ aŶiŵal, ǁhiĐh is a puƌelǇ oƌgaŶiĐ ďeiŶg: ͚Its 
power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in 
its phǇsiĐal Ŷatuƌe.͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϰϲͿ  
Later in the chapter on anomic suicide, attempting to explain why married women – 
unlike married men – do not seem to be more prone to anomic suicide in societies where 
divorce has become sufficiently widespread to have weakened the moral institution of 
marriage, Durkheim exposes again the contradiction in his thinking: 
 
WoŵeŶ͛s seǆual Ŷeeds haǀe less of a ŵeŶtal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ďeĐause, geŶerally speaking, 
her mental life is less developed. These needs are more closely related to the needs 
of the organism, following rather than leading them, and consequently find in them 
an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature than man, woman has only to 
follow her instincts to find calmness and peace. She thus does not require so strict a 
social regulation as marriage, and particularly as monogamic marriage. (1951: 272) 
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 It is the ͚ŵeŶtal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ of desiƌes, iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, aŶd Ŷot theiƌ ͚iŶstiŶĐtiǀe͛ 
nature, which renders them susceptible to over-excitation. And since the mind is the 
repository of society, it is quite logical that it is society which is responsible for this over-
excitation, this surplus of desire. Hence Durkheim does not eǆplaiŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ͚less 
deǀeloped͛ ŵeŶtal life thƌough ďiologiĐal ƌeduĐtioŶisŵ, ďut ďǇ iŵpliĐit ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the ǁaǇ 
women in the nineteenth-century were denied independent access to the public sphere of 
politiĐs aŶd leaƌŶiŶg. ͚WoŵaŶ kills heƌself less…Ŷot because of physiological differences 
fƌoŵ ŵaŶ ďut ďeĐause she does Ŷot paƌtiĐipate iŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe life iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ.͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: 
ϯϰϭ; see also ϭϲϲ, ϮϭϱͿ AŶd ďeĐause the ǁoŵaŶ ͚does Ŷot ƌeƋuiƌe so stƌiĐt a soĐial 
ƌegulatioŶ as ŵaƌƌiage͛, the tǇpe of suiĐide ŵost common among married women is of a 
different sort – that ͚deƌiǀiŶg fƌoŵ eǆĐessiǀe ƌegulatioŶ, that of peƌsoŶs ǁith futuƌes 
pitilesslǇ ďloĐked aŶd passioŶs ǀioleŶtlǇ Đhoked ďǇ oppƌessiǀe disĐipliŶe͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: Ϯϳϲ ŶϮϱ; see 
also 189). 
Hence for men, in Durkheiŵ͛s aŶalǇsis, it is ĐleaƌlǇ Ŷot ;oƌ Ŷot justͿ a deficit in 
ĐiǀilisatioŶ, ďut ƌatheƌ ͚hypercivilisation ǁhiĐh ďƌeeds the aŶoŵiĐ teŶdeŶĐǇ͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϯϮϯ, ŵǇ 
eŵphasisͿ. ͚The loŶgiŶg foƌ iŶfiŶitǇ is dailǇ ƌepƌeseŶted as a ŵaƌk of ŵoƌal distiŶĐtioŶ͛, 
Durkheim coŵplaiŶs of soĐietǇ͛s ĐolleĐtiǀe oďsessioŶ ǁith boundless novelty, innovation 
and excess, further demonstrating his conviction that moral and ideological forces can 
eŶgeŶdeƌ pathologiĐal as ǁell as feliĐitous desiƌes. ͚The doĐtƌiŶe of the ŵost ƌuthless aŶd 
sǁift pƌogƌess has ďeĐoŵe aŶ aƌtiĐle of faith.͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϱϳͿ 
 
As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is 
harder to  make them accept resignation; so the number of the malcontent and 
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disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality of progress and perfection is 
thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomy. (1951: 364) 
 
 If soĐietǇ ͚iŶoĐulates͛ people ǁith the idea – with aŶ ͚eŶtiƌe ŵoƌalitǇ͛ – that it is their 
͚dutǇ͛ to pƌogƌess, theŶ it ĐleaƌlǇ ŵakes Ŷo seŶse to saǇ, as Durkheim (1973b: 162) did, that 
aŶoŵiĐ passioŶs aŶd desiƌes ͚deƌiǀe fƌoŵ ouƌ iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶstitutioŶs͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ fƌoŵ 
͚soĐial Đauses͛; and it makes no sense to claim, as Giddens (1966: 278) did, that anomie 
ƌefeƌs to a situatioŶ ǁheƌe ͚soĐial Ŷoƌŵs Đoŵe to eǆeƌĐise oŶlǇ a loǁ leǀel of ƌegulatoƌǇ 
control oveƌ ďehaǀiouƌ͛. EǀeŶ Douglas͛s pƌopositioŶ that, iŶ keepiŶg ǁith Duƌkheiŵ͛s theoƌǇ 
of the dualisŵ of ďodǇ aŶd soul, aŶoŵie should ďe thought of a ͚soĐial foƌĐe͛ ǁhiĐh aĐts ďǇ 
͚iŶĐƌeasiŶg the effeĐt of the ďodǇ oŶ iŶdiǀidual aĐtioŶs͛ ;ϭϵϳϬ: ϯϰϱͿ, uŶdeƌplaǇs Duƌkheiŵ͛s 
understanding of anomic tendencies being fostered by collective representations – or what 
Maƌǆ ǁould haǀe Đalled ͚ideologies͛ – which clearly belong to the province of the soul or 
social mind. 
 
Egoism 
Siŵilaƌ teŶsioŶs aƌe appaƌeŶt iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s disĐussion of egoistic suicide. Egoism apparently 
arises from weak social bonds and insufficient involvement in collective life. The effect of 
this ͚eǆĐessiǀe iŶdiǀidualisŵ͛ is to ŵake human mortality intolerable by fostering existential 
douďts ǁhiĐh deŶse soĐial ties, ďǇ ͚iŶtegƌatiŶg͛ iŶdiǀiduals ŵoƌe pƌofouŶdlǇ iŶto supƌa-
individual sentiments and pƌaĐtiĐes, ĐaŶ otheƌǁise hold iŶ aďeǇaŶĐe. ͚WheŶ, theƌefoƌe, ǁe 
have no other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought that our efforts will finally 
eŶd iŶ ŶothiŶgŶess, siŶĐe ǁe ouƌselǀes disappeaƌ.͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϭϬͿ 
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 Protestants are more prone to egoistic suicide than Catholics, Durkheim argues, not 
because of the content of the Reformist faith – the ͚details of dogŵas aŶd ƌites aƌe 
seĐoŶdaƌǇ͛ – ďut ͚ďeĐause it has feǁeƌ ĐoŵŵoŶ ďeliefs aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes͛ ;ϭϵϱ1: 170, 159), 
allowing Protestants more ͚fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ͛ ĐhuƌĐh doĐtƌiŶe, aŶd ŵoƌe latitude to Ƌuestion 
and judge the Ŷatuƌe of ƌeligious tƌuth. Duƌkheiŵ does Ŷote the eǆisteŶĐe of ͚ŵetaphǇsiĐal 
aŶd ƌeligious sǇsteŵs͛ ǁhiĐh, as he saǁ it, ͚atteŵpt to pƌoǀe to ŵeŶ the seŶselessŶess of 
life͛. But his aƌguŵeŶt is that these ͚Ŷeǁ ŵoƌalities͛ aƌe ͚aŶ affeĐt ƌatheƌ thaŶ a Đause; theǇ 
merely symbolise in abstract language and systematic form the physiological distress of the 
ďodǇ soĐial.͛ Theiƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe hue is theƌefoƌe a pale suďstitute foƌ geŶuiŶe solidarity and a 
tƌue ĐolleĐtiǀe ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe. The ŵoƌďid egoist ͚effeĐts ĐoŵŵuŶioŶ thƌough sadŶess ǁheŶ he 
Ŷo loŶgeƌ has aŶǇthiŶg else ǁith ǁhiĐh to aĐhieǀe it͛. ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϭϰͿ 
But Durkheim knew full well that intellectual autonomy and self-reliance were, as 
Weber documented at length, ethical imperatives central to the Protestant faith. Religious 
freedom, Parsons (1968: 332) pointed out in his analysis of Suicide, ͚is a ďasiĐ ethiĐal ǀalue 
ĐoŵŵoŶ to all PƌotestaŶts͛. IŶdeed, iŶ The Elementary Forms of Religious Life [1912] 
Durkheim himself acknowledged the moral debt we owe to this religious tradition, noting 
that todaǇ ͚it ǁould ďe saĐƌilege foƌ a ŵaŶ to deŶǇ pƌogƌess aŶd flout the huŵaŶistiĐ ideal 
to ǁhiĐh ŵodeƌŶ soĐieties aƌe attaĐhed͛, this ͚saĐƌed͛ ideal ďeiŶg the uŶtouĐhaďle ͚pƌiŶĐiple 
of fƌee eŶƋuiƌǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϲϭͿ. As PaƌsoŶs iŶsisted: 
 
An institutionalised order in which individuals are expected to assume great 
responsibility and strive for high achievement, and in which they are rewarded 
through socially organised sanctions of such behaviour, cannot be accounted for by 
postulating the lessening of all aspects of institutionalised control. Instead, such an 
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order, with its common values, its institutionalised norms, its sanctions and media, 
its mechanisms of social control, represents a particular mode of institutional 
structuring. (1967: 30) 
 
Further evidence that Durkheim was unsure whether to theorise egoism as a deficit 
in collective norms and practices, or as the outcome of particular kinds of norms and 
practices, comes from the ambiguous descriptions of egoism in Suicide. Noting that this 
particular suicidal tendency is disproportionately high among the intelligentsia, Durkheim 
ƌefeƌs to ͚the state of ŵoƌal iŶdiǀidualisŵ͛ as the Đause of this ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϭϲϴͿ. AŶd iŶ his 
conclusion to the book, Durkheim makes explicit his fear that the seculaƌ ͚ƌeligioŶ of the 
iŶdiǀidual͛, ǁhile Ŷot the saŵe as egoisŵ, is siŵilaƌ eŶough to pƌoŵote it: 
 
in societies and environments where the dignity of the person is the supreme end of 
conduct, where man is a God to mankind, the individual is readily inclined to 
consider the man in himself as a God and to regard himself as the object of his own 
Đult. WheŶ ŵoƌalitǇ ĐoŶsists pƌiŵaƌilǇ iŶ giǀiŶg oŶe a ǀeƌǇ high idea of oŶe͛s self, 
certain combinations of circumstances readily suffice to make man unable to 
perceive anything above himself. Individualism is of course not necessarily egoism, 
but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stimulated without the other being 
enlarged. Thus, egoistic suicide arises. (1951: 363-4) 
 
 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in PaƌsoŶs͛ leŶgthǇ disĐussioŶ of Duƌkheiŵ, 
egoism and moral individualism are not clearly distinguished from each other. Meanwhile 
egoism and altruism – ŶoƌŵallǇ ƌegaƌded as opposiŶg polaƌities oŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s sĐale of 
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social integration – are treated by Parsons as manifestations of two different contents of the 
collective conscience which together, in his view, can be contrasted with the deficit in moral 
Ŷoƌŵs that giǀes ƌise to ͚aŶoŵie͛ ;PaƌsoŶs ϭϵϲϴ: ϰϬϱ ŶϭͿ. 
 I have suggested above, however, that even this interpretation of Durkheim grants 
him more coherence than is justified, foƌ ͚aŶoŵie͛ ǁas also uŶdeƌstood ďǇ Duƌkheiŵ to ďe 
sustained by particular social forces. What this analysis demonstrates is how difficult 
Durkheim found it to extract his critique of the methodological individualism of the 
utilitarians from the grip of their own presuppositions. For the utilitarians, the wants and 
desires of individuals are randomly divergent and essentially lawless, and social order can be 
achieved only by regulating the external conditions by which self-interested individuals 
pursue their sovereign ends. Although Durkheim was susceptible to reproducing this idea of 
a ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ oƌ ͚pƌe-soĐial͛ iŶdiǀidual ǁhose iŶsatiaďle aŶd egoĐeŶtƌiĐ desiƌes eǆplaiŶed the 
need for society to exert a moderating and constraining influence, the chief insight 
attributed to him by Parsons, as well as by Giddens (1971), was his more radical assertion 
that ͚the iŶdiǀidual͛ – eǀeƌǇ iŶdiǀidual, aŶd eǀeƌǇ foƌŵ of ͚iŶdiǀidualisŵ͛ – is already the 
creation of society. 
 
Suicide and social meaning 
Further indication that egoism and anomie are socially constructed forms of selfhood comes 
from Douglas͛s ;ϭϵϳϬͿ asseƌtioŶ that Durkheim understood suicide to be an act loaded with 
social meanings. That the meaning of suicide is social rather than individual is apparent from 
the ĐoŶĐeptual ŵethodologǇ of Duƌkheiŵ͛s studǇ, and the way he constructed a typology of 
suicide that is richly suggestive of the sentiments and motives of those who take their own 
liǀes. These ͚tǇpes͛ – Duƌkheiŵ eǀeŶ ďoƌƌoǁs Weďeƌ͛s heƌŵeŶeutiĐ ŶotioŶ of the ͚ideal 
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tǇpe͛ ;ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϳϴͿ – make sense to the reader because they articulate with understandings of 
suicide that are already part of public culture. And this is no accident, because Durkheim 
himself constructed his categories out of well-established social understandings, with 
egoism and anomie (though the latter term was not in common usage) already part of both 
commonsense and more technical views of the moral malaise of the age (Douglas 1970: 17-
18).  
The attitude of melancholic languor and meditative self-absorption that Durkheim 
associates with egoistic suicide, for example, is constructed using the description of the 
pƌotagoŶist of LaŵaƌtiŶe͛s Ŷoǀel Raphaël (1849), who was brought to the brink of suicide by 
his experience of solitude and unrequited love (Durkheim 1951: 278-80). For anomie, on the 
otheƌ haŶd, Duƌkheiŵ dƌaǁs oŶ ChateauďƌiaŶd͛s ƌoŵaŶtiĐist Ŷoǀella René (1802), the 
eponymous protagonist of which is driven to suicidal thoughts by a surplus of passion, 
seŶsitiǀitǇ aŶd desiƌe. ͚While ‘aphaël is a Đƌeatuƌe of ŵeditatioŶ ǁho fiŶds his ƌuiŶ ǁithiŶ 
hiŵself͛, Duƌkheiŵ eǆplaiŶs, ͚‘eŶé is the iŶsatiate tǇpe͛. ‘eŶé is like Goethe͛s Weƌtheƌ, ͚the 
turbulent heart as he calls himself, enamoured of infinity, killing himself from disappointed 
loǀe͛. ;Duƌkheiŵ ϭϵϱϭ: ϮϴϲͿ That The Sorrows of Young Werther ;ϭϳϳϰͿ led ͚Weƌtheƌ feǀeƌ͛ 
to spread across Europe, with impressionable male readers adopting the passionate 
protagoŶist͛s stǇle of dƌess, aŶd soŵe takiŶg theiƌ oǁŶ liǀes iŶ ǁhat soĐiologists aŶd 
ďehaǀiouƌal psǇĐhologists haǀe desĐƌiďed as the fiƌst ŵajoƌ iŶstaŶĐe of ͚ĐopǇĐat͛ suiĐide, is 
itself further evidence of the social meaning of suicide. Just as Durkheim drew on 
established social meanings to construct his typology of suicide, in other words, so other 
social actors draw on the same circulating meanings to cultivate their longings, make sense 
of their frustrations, and, in extreme cases, to construct suicide as a meaningful response.2 
Even coroners, as Atkinson (1971) showed, participate in the transmission of these social 
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meanings, employing social understandings of the kinds of circumstances under which 
people might want to kill themselves in order to distinguish suicide from accidental death. 
IŶ Douglas͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Duƌkheiŵ, theƌefoƌe, it is Ŷot the laĐk of soĐial 
meaning – ͚ŶoƌŵlessŶess͛ – which causes suicide, but rather particular social meanings 
which become dominant over others. Douglas thus treats egoism, anomie, altruism and 
fatalism as ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs͛, sǇŵďoliĐ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes that Đoŵpƌise the ͚pools of 
ŵeaŶiŶg͛ that iŶdiǀiduals utilise to ŵake seŶse of theiƌ liǀes. TheǇ ƌepƌeseŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
Douglas, ͚geŶeƌalised oƌieŶtatioŶs toǁaƌd soĐietǇ͛ – expressing, respectively, aloofness, 
rebelliousness, submission, and resignation – which are institutionalised and transmitted in 
specific areas of life (altruism in the military, for example, anomie in business and 
commerce, and egoism among the intelligentsia). In ideal circumstances the strength of 
these opposing social representations (egoism vs altruism, anomie vs fatalism) balance each 
otheƌ aŶd ƌesult iŶ a healthǇ iŶtegƌatioŶ oƌ ͚eƋuiliďƌiuŵ͛. ͚Wheƌe theǇ offset oŶe aŶotheƌ͛, 
Durkheim himself writes in Suicide, ͚the ŵoƌal ageŶt is iŶ a state of eƋuiliďƌiuŵ ǁhiĐh 
shelters him against any thought of suicide. But let one of them exceed a certain strength to 
the detriment of others, and as it becomes individualised, it also becomes suicidogenetiĐ͛ 
(1951: 321). 
 
Base and superstructure 
This critical exegesis of Duƌkheiŵ͛s ǁoƌk has shown that his understanding of the 
relationship between individual and society was contradictory and inconsistent. Though he 
flirted with the idea that society creates, rather than just constrains, the individual, his 
conviction that capitalism needed to be reformed rather than replaced meant his analysis 
stopped short of a full exploration of how egoistic and anomic forms of individualism were a 
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normal product of the market society, while the ideological spectre of the naturally egoistic, 
͚pƌe-soĐial͛ iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶtiŶued to hauŶt his ƌeasoŶiŶg.  
 I noted at the beginning how in The Rules Duƌkheiŵ theoƌised ͚ideologǇ͛ as aŶ 
obstacle rather than an object of social science – not as a social fact, but as a natural 
predisposition of the human mind. In Suicide we saw how Durkheim presented egoism and 
anomie inconsistently, sometimes as natural dispositions and sometimes as social 
constructions sustained, as Cladis (1992a) is keen to stress, by particular cultural narratives 
aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes. IŶ ͚The Dualisŵ of HuŵaŶ Natuƌe͛ Duƌkheiŵ ƌeǀeƌted to a conception of the 
individual as naturally egocentric, while describing society uncritically as the sacred source 
of morality. Finally, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim treated ideological illusions like the 
belief in a god as ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs͛ reflecting back, in an idealised form, the 
common life of society͛s ŵeŵďeƌs. These idealisations, Durkheim claimed, were no longer 
an expression of human nature but instead ͚a Ŷatuƌal pƌoduĐt of soĐial life͛ (2001: 317). 
While the practices of science have progressively taken over the cognitive function of 
religion, the cultivation of collective sentiments ǁhiĐh ͚pƌoŵote liǀiŶg aŶd aĐtiŶg͛ aŶd ͚push 
thought ahead of ǁhat sĐieŶĐe alloǁs us to ĐoŶfiƌŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϯϮϲͿ ƌeŵaiŶs, Durkheim argued, 
the indispensable function of religious faith. This may be faith in the dignity and value of all 
human beings – it may be ͚ŵoƌal iŶdiǀidualisŵ͛ – ďut ŶothiŶg iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s logiĐ pƌeĐludes 
that it could equally be faith in the essential selfishness of the human animal, or in the god-
given right to profit from the misfortunes of others. 
If ideological pƌeĐoŶĐeptioŶs iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s eaƌlǇ thiŶkiŶg were conceived as a 
natural result of the spontaneous adaptation of individuals to their environment, in his final 
work, as Larrain (1979: 99) notes, it is social consciousness which is hǇpostatised ͚as a kind 
of seĐoŶd Ŷatuƌe͛. In neither case is the specific social determination – the material 
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conditions, interests and practices – of ideological beliefs systematically acknowledged and 
explored. Although, as I noted at the outset, some new readings of Duƌkheiŵ͛s 
epistemology have stressed the primacy of enacted social practices to his theory of ͚soĐial 
faĐts͛, even here it remains unclear what kind of practices are currently responsible, in 
todaǇ͛s ubiquitously commercialised society, for producing and sustaining the moral form of 
individualism that, to use Larrain͛s ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ, ǁould ďe a ͚soĐiallǇ deteƌŵiŶed͛ 
ĐoŶsĐiousŶess ďut Ŷot aŶ ͚ideologiĐal͛ oŶe.3  
Had Durkheim witnessed the neoliberal revolutions of the late twentieth-century, he 
would surely have acknowledged that greed, ruthlessness, and indifference to the sufferings 
of others are neither instinctual expressions of human nature nor marginal deviations from 
the normative core of Western modernity, but are traits and values rooted in the economic 
organisation of capitalist societies and the ideological apparatuses that sacralise and sustain 
them. More pointedly, had Durkheim not been blinded by belief in the organic reform of 
capitalism, he would surely have detected the deep structural contradictions of fin de siècle 
France, and the cultural narratives and norms that both articulated and concealed them. He 
would have seen, for example, how the anti-humanist rhetoric of French chauvinism and 
xenophobia was not a superficial stain on the national consciousness of the Third Republic, 
but rather the ideological reflex of a politically and economically fractured society, 
sublimating and unifying the disparate grievances of alienated Catholics, a petty bourgeoisie 
struggling against the growing concentration of capital, and an angry lumpenproletariat 
impatient with the slow pace of social reform.  
No contemporary of Durkheim could have anticipated how boldly the anti-
Dreyfusards would return from the shadows and exact their revenge 40 years later. But a 
sociologist of Durkheim͛s Đaliďƌe had scant excuse for isolating the Dreyfus case from the 
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decade or more of aggressive colonial expansion which preceded it. It was the grand 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe of FƌaŶĐe͛s ͚ĐiǀilisiŶg ŵissioŶ͛, aŶd ŵoƌe repellent claims of racial superiority and a 
biological struggle for survival, which were the moral fables used to explain the emergency 
export of unemployed labour and surplus capital during the 1880s Depression. In the 
popular French fiction of the period, it was the tough and virile forerunners of Aryan 
supremacism who were the exemplary individuals admired by the novel-reading public – 
men like Jules VeƌŶe͛s CaptaiŶ Neŵo, or colonial artilleryman-turned-author Ernest Psichari, 
whose later autobiographical novel, Voyage du Centurion (1916), presented colonial combat 
as a neo-Roman antidote to insipid metropolitan humanism. Fellow novelist Louis Betrand 
likewise depicted the coloŶies as a ͚FƌeŶĐh Wild West͛ seƌǀiŶg as ͚a sĐhool of ŶatioŶal 
eŶeƌgǇ͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the histoƌiaŶ ‘ogeƌ Magƌaǁ, ǁhile ‘oďeƌt ‘aŶdau, iŶ his ϭϵϬϳ Ŷoǀel 
Les Colons, poƌtƌaǇed the settleƌs as ͚ǀiƌile, ƌuthless, ďƌutal, pƌaĐtiĐal, a Ŷeǁ ďƌeed of 
NietzsĐheaŶ supeƌŵeŶ, ƌejeĐtiŶg aŶaeŵiĐ EuƌopeaŶ seŶtiŵeŶtalitǇ͛ ;Magƌaǁ ϭϵϴϴ:239). 
Was the French diplomat and aging colonial entrepreneur Ferdinand de Lesseps 
formed in the same buccaneering mould? In The Way We Live Now (1875) Anthony Trollope 
had penned a biting satire on the moral progression of Victorian capitalism, with the 
irresistible financial imposter Augustus Melmotte blazing a mesmerising trail through the 
frayed and frightened ranks of the English gentry. Across the Channel, de Lesseps had been 
feted for the success of the Suez Canal, but when his Panama project encountered 
difficulties he didŶ͛t hesitate to deceive and embezzle to keep his dreams alive. Employing 
German-Jewish financiers as middlemen, and in doing so stoking the anti-semitic paranoia 
that would soon claim Dreyfus, he bribed bankers, journalists, and hundreds of members of 
parliament to suppress the truth and support a government-backed lottery loan that was 
still not enough to save the doomed venture. More than 800,000 small French investors 
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were ruined when the Panama Canal Company was declared bankrupt in 1889. Over 20,000 
labourers on the project had already lost their lives to accidents and disease. According to 
Arendt (1973: 95-6), the full exposure of the scandal revealed, at ďest, ͚that the ŵeŵďeƌs of 
Parliament and civil servants had become businessŵeŶ͛, and worse, that politics was 
degeŶeƌatiŶg iŶto ͚gaŶgsteƌisŵ͛. Back in England, Trollope was reflecting on the spread of 
this new moral creed of extravagant and ruthless individualism. Melŵotte͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌ, he 
explained in his autobiography, was iŶteŶded to shoǁ hoǁ ͚a certain class of dishonesty, 
dishonesty magnificent in its proportions, and climbing into high places, has become at the 
same time so rampant and so splendid that there seems to be reason for fearing that men 
and women will be taught to feel that dishonesty, if it can become splendid, will cease to be 
aďoŵiŶaďle.͛ (Cited in Smalley 1969: 394) 
Out of social and economic realities, values and ideas are born; out of their practical 
conditions of existence, people͛s feaƌs, appetites aŶd expectations are shaped, selves are 
fashioned and the parameters of the possible, the normal and the necessary are defined. In 
Joas͛s ǀieǁ, the pƌoďleŵ ǁith ŵodeƌŶ liďeƌalisŵ ƌesides Ŷot iŶ the theoƌǇ, ďut iŶ the 
deficient implementation of its ideals; hence those beliefs and practices that clash today 
ǁith Duƌkheiŵ͛s ŵoƌal iŶdiǀidualisŵ ͚ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe iŶteƌpƌeted as ƌuŶŶiŶg ĐouŶteƌ to the 
saĐƌalisatioŶ of the peƌsoŶ, Ŷot as a sigŶ of its iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶs͛ ;Joas ϮϬϭϮ: ϲϭͿ. What 
today runs counter, however, also runs deep, for over the last half-century it is the liberal 
capitalist nations, not their fanatical critics, that have led the most sustained assault on the 
frontiers of the person, desacralizing the human body through rampant commercial 
sexualisation, quarrying embryonic human life for medical research and treatment, and 
degrading human thought, increasingly bewitched by the fantasy of intelligent machines, 
into a machine itself – into a transmittable formula or technique which, in Octavio Paz͛s 
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ǁoƌds, ͚puts the future of our species into question͛ because it ͚damages the very essence 
of the idea of the human person conceived of as a unique and unrepeatable being͛ (1995: 
246-7). 
Moral individualism may therefore be a noble and worthy goal, but the ideas most 
likely to promote or retard its advance will be those that offer a purchase on the obstacles 
and conflicts of a more troublesome reality. In this society, even more thaŶ iŶ Duƌkheiŵ͛s, 
one cannot be a rational moral agent without complicity in an irrational and immoral world. 
If Durkheim is still relevant to this world, as I believe he is, it is not because of the perfection 
of his ideas, but because their imperfections express the real contradictions with which we 
live. 
 
 
 
28 
 
Notes 
1 MeƌtoŶ͛s faŵous appliĐatioŶ of the theoƌǇ of aŶoŵie to deǀiaŶt ďehaǀiouƌ, ǁhiĐh touĐhed 
ďƌieflǇ oŶ the ͚ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the Đultuƌal eŵphasis oŶ peĐuŶiaƌǇ aŵďitioŶ aŶd the 
soĐial ďaƌs to full oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϰϯͿ, led to the idea that anomie is partly a matter of 
ƌesouƌĐe distƌiďutioŶ, eǆpƌessiŶg the ͚stƌaiŶ͛ suffeƌed ďǇ the less foƌtuŶate ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe 
denied the material means to achieve what is most socially valued. But for Merton the 
actual strain was normative, with excessive moral endorsement of success goals promoted 
at the eǆpeŶse of the ŵoƌal saŶĐtifiĐatioŶ of legitiŵate ŵeaŶs. ͚With suĐh diffeƌeŶtial 
emphases upon goals and institutional procedures, the latter may be so vitiated by the 
stress on goals as to have the behaviour of many individuals limited only by considerations 
of teĐhŶiĐal eǆpedieŶĐǇ.͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϯϱͿ Duƌkheiŵ͛s oǁŶ positioŶ seeŵed to ďe that theƌe ǁas 
an irreconcilable conflict between the insatiability of human desire and inescapable material 
constraints (constraints which Freud (2002: 15) listed as natural scarcity, human mortality, 
and the clashing wills of other human beings), and that a person depleted of moral restraint 
aŶd defaultiŶg to ͚ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs of teĐhŶiĐal eǆpedieŶĐǇ͛, ǁould still eŶĐouŶteƌ the 
potentially suicidogenic experience of frustrated aspirations. 
2 Duƌkheiŵ ŵight also haǀe thought of TolstoǇ͛s Anna Karenina, who is driven to suicide by 
an adulterous passion that causes such social ostracism that in the end her lover is her only 
corroborator, yet one incapable of satisfying the extravagance of her desire. The possible 
role played by the romantic novel iŶ ĐultiǀatiŶg uŶƌealistiĐ, poteŶtiallǇ ͚aŶoŵiĐ͛ ďut deeplǇ 
meaningful ideals of conjugal bliss amongst a predominantly female bourgeois readership, is 
another aspect of the social construction of desire that Durkheim overlooks. Giddens (1966: 
278), who insists that anomie is related to vague or inadequate social norms, whereas 
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egoisŵ is ƌooted iŶ the deĐliŶe of stƌuĐtuƌed soĐial ďoŶds ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ͚soĐial values 
pƌoŵotiŶg iŶdiǀidualisŵ, peƌsoŶal iŶitiatiǀe aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ͛, pƌediĐtaďlǇ assoĐiates 
͚ǀalues ǁhiĐh plaĐe stƌess upoŶ ƌoŵaŶtiĐ loǀe͛ ǁith egoisŵ, siŶĐe theǇ ͚plaĐe the oŶus oŶ 
each individual to search out and win a partner through his own efforts͛. Coŵpaƌe this to 
Hoƌkheiŵeƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶt that the ƌoŵaŶtiĐ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the ǁoŵaŶ as ŶatuƌallǇ 
passionate, while undoubtedly ideological, also allowed her to defy the egocentric logic of 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌatioŶalitǇ: it ͚eŶaďled heƌ to aǀoid ƌeduĐtioŶ to oďjeĐt-status and thus to 
represent, amid an evil society, another possibility. In the passage from the old serfdom to 
the new she could be regarded as a representation of nature, which eluded utilitarian 
ĐalĐulatioŶ.͛ ;Hoƌkheiŵeƌ ϭϵϳϰ: ϭϲͿ 
3 Rawls (2003: 302) argues, against the theory that associates moral individualism with the 
collective conscience, that Durkheim understood collective beliefs to be dysfunctional to the 
modern diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ, ǁith ͚aŶoŵie͛ aƌisiŶg ͚fƌoŵ a failuƌe to giǀe up suffiĐieŶt shared 
ďeliefs to alloǁ foƌ the ƌegulatioŶ of pƌaĐtiĐe ďǇ justiĐe ƌatheƌ thaŶ ďelief͛. Though ‘aǁls 
ŵakes ŵuĐh of the kiŶship ďetǁeeŶ Duƌkheiŵ aŶd Maƌǆ, she ŵisses Maƌǆ͛s iŶsight that 
capitalism can dispense with an ideological belief system descending from above (i.e. can 
dispeŶse ǁith the ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛ of ƌeligious ďeliefs), precisely because it generates, 
sui generis, its own form concealment – ͚the fantastic form of a relation between things͛ – 
through the circulation of commodities. It is participation in practices of exchange, in other 
words, that makes capitalism appear free, equal and just. (Marx 1976: 164-5, 279-80) 
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